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*J.B.L. 252 Introduction
This article analyses how English courts very recently addressed the potential convergence between
the significant doctrines of piercing the corporate veil, party autonomy in jurisdiction agreements and
privity of contract. These three doctrines are significant because they constitute the lifeblood of
international commercial transactions.
Piercing the corporate veil is a common law doctrine that is utilised to disregard the corporate
personality rule,1 in very rare or limited circumstances where a person or persons (the controller)
under an existing legal obligation or restriction abuses the company’s corporate structure by
committing a grave or relevant impropriety, and it is necessary to grant the remedy because there is
no other remedy available to the victim.2 Piercing the corporate veil is regarded as a very limited or
rare exception to the corporate personality rule, because the corporate personality rule is legally and
economically fundamental to the business world—"limited companies have been the principal unit of
commercial life for more than a century".3 Party autonomy in jurisdiction agreements in this article
refers to the freedom of parties domiciled in Member States of the Brussels I Regulation 4 to choose
the court that decides their contractual disputes.5 The use of jurisdiction agreements is commonplace
among international traders as the overwhelming majority of EU *J.B.L. 253 companies also utilise it.
6 Jurisdiction agreements aid legal certainty and enable the parties to foresee the court that has
jurisdiction thereby reducing the risk of concurrent proceedings and associated litigation costs.7 The
doctrine of privity of contract confers rights and obligations on only persons who are privy to an
agreement.8 The doctrine of privity of contract is recognised as a fundamental aspect of English
contract law9 as well as in other legal systems of Member States of the EU.10
In this respect, the issue that recently confronted English courts is whether the court can pierce the
corporate veil of a company so as to recognise the controller of the company (who is not privy to the
contract) as a party to the contract for the purpose of enforcing a part of the contract that gives
exclusive jurisdiction to English courts. The law as it stands authoritatively in England resolves the
issue in the negative.
The second part of this article provides a chronological background on the varied approaches taken
by English courts on this issue. The third part of this article analyses the approach of the English
Judges in reaching their decision. The fourth part of this article considers both its future implications
on international commercial transactions and the policy reasons behind the decisions. The fifth part of
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this article contains the conclusion.
Chronological background
The English court was first confronted with this issue in the case of Antonio Gramsci Shipping Corp v
Stepanovs.11 In this case, the claimants alleged that Mr Stepanovs, Mr Lembergs12 and others were
involved in a fraudulent scheme to unjustly enrich themselves and deprive the claimant of huge profits
by interposing their companies as charterers of some vessels at less than the market rate and then
sub-chartering the vessels to another company at the market rate and keeping the difference. The
charterparties contained a clause that vested exclusive jurisdiction in English courts. The claimants
proceeded separately against Mr Stepanovs and got a worldwide freezing order of his assets on ex
parte application to the court. The basis upon which the claimants sought English jurisdiction at the ex
parte stage before Beatson J. and interlocutory proceedings before Burton J. was that the court
should pierce the corporate veil to make Mr Stepanovs privy to the contract for the purpose of
enforcing the exclusive jurisdiction clause in the contract because he abused the corporate structure
of the companies that entered into the contract. In other words, he should be seen in the eyes of the
law as being the *J.B.L. 254 original party to the contract that fraudulently procured the corporate
defendants to enter into it.
Mr Stepanovs sought to challenge the jurisdiction of the court on the basis that it did not have
jurisdiction under art.23 of Brussels I because he was not privy to the contract (and did not consent to
it) which the corporate defendants (he was alleged to control) entered into. Burton J. rejected the
argument and, concurring with the obiter views of Beatson J. at the ex parte stage of the case,13 held
that this was a case where the court should justifiably pierce the corporate veil and make him privy to
the contract by treating the companies’ acts as his acts from the outset, for the purpose of
establishing jurisdiction in English courts under art.23 of Brussels I.14 Burton J. also held that Mr
Stepanovs was also to be regarded as having consented to the jurisdiction agreement as a matter of
EU law under art.23.15 Burton J.’s decision was not challenged.
In Linsen International Ltd v Humpuss Sea Transport PTE Ltd,16 Flaux J. was confronted (on different
facts and circumstances)17 with the opportunity to make an observation on the correctness of the
decision in the Stepanovs case. Flaux J. distinguished and justified Burton J.’s decision, which
pierced the corporate veil to establish English jurisdiction under art.23 of Brussels I on the basis that
in the Stepanovs case:
"The whole purpose of the corporate structure was to perpetrate the relevant fraud from the outset
and both the chartering companies and the charterparties themselves were effectively a sham or
façade from the outset." 18
The High Court before Arnold J. was again confronted with this issue in the case of VTB Capital Plc v
Nutritek International Corp.19 In this case, the claimants sought to amend their particulars of claim and
sought to pierce the corporate veil in order to hold the corporate defendants and Mr Malofeev jointly
and severally liable with another corporate defendant (RAP) for unlawful misrepresentation in
inducing the claimant to avail the corporate defendant a loan facility. The purpose of the claimant’s
case was to establish English jurisdiction under art.23 of Brussels I (as provided in the loan facility
agreement with RAP) against the Mr Malofeev and the other corporate defendants (who were not
privy to the loan facility agreement) for abusing the corporate structure of RAP and making unlawful
misrepresentations about RAP in inducing the claimant to enter into the contract. Arnold J. dismissed
the claimant’s case and held that the decision in Stepanovs was wrongly decided insofar as it held
that the corporate veil can be pierced for *J.B.L. 255 the purpose of holding a party who is not privy
to a contract liable under the contract to establish jurisdiction under art.23 of Brussels I.20 Arnold J.,
however, held that, assuming he was wrong and Burton J. was right as a matter of English law with
respect to identifying the defendants as parties to the contract through the doctrine of piercing the
corporate veil to establish English jurisdiction under art.23, then the defendants should be regarded
as having consented to the jurisdiction clause as a matter of EU law under art.23.21
Arnold J.’s decision also came (for consideration) before Burton J. in Alliance Bank JSC v Aquanta
Corp.22 In this case the corporate claimant alleged that the sixth to eighth defendants (and other
defendants) were part of a fraudulent scheme to obtain a loan from two banks (the lenders) in the
significant sum of about US$1.1 billion dollars, and with their influence and position as controllers of
the claimant’s company, made the corporate claimant the guarantor under the loan agreement by
causing the claimant to acquire US Treasury Notes (also called STRIPS) in the total value of US$1.1
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billion dollars to secure the transaction. The claimant alleged that the sixth to eighth defendants
conspired to set up corporate offshore companies in jurisdictions with less inspection and regulation
for the very fraudulent purpose of acquiring the loan from the lenders, which they never had any
intention of paying back. The claimant was made to fulfil the obligation of the corporate offshore
companies allegedly created by the sixth to eighth defendants, when the corporate offshore
companies were in default under the loan agreement with the lenders. The claimant sought to amend
its particulars of claim to bring a claim (for service of writ out of jurisdiction) in subrogation against the
sixth to eighth defendants as parties to the loan agreement (they were not privy to) and the exclusive
jurisdiction agreement contained therein. The claimant at the interlocutory stage relied on the doctrine
of piercing the veil to hold the sixth to eighth defendants as parties to the loan agreement for the
purpose of establishing the existence and exercise of English jurisdiction against them. Burton J.
referred to his decision in Stepanovs and observed that although Flaux J. in Linsen International did
not doubt his decision in Stepanovs, Arnold J. in VTB had declined to follow that decision. Burton J.
opted to follow his decision in Stepanovs without providing reasons as to why he thought Arnold J.
was wrong.23
The decision in the VTB case was appealed against and for the first time the English Court of Appeal
24 had to pronounce on the vexed issue confronting the High Court. Arnold J.’s decision was affirmed
and Burton J.’s decision on the issue was overruled as wrongly decided.25 The English Court of
Appeal in a reasoned judgment came to the conclusion that using the doctrine of piercing the
corporate veil to make a person who is not privy to a contract to become bound by it in order to
establish jurisdiction under art.23 of Brussels I is not a cause of action known to English law and did
not feel there was good justification to stretch the exceptions to the established principles of corporate
legal personality and privity of contract.26 The English Court of Appeal’s decision in VTB was
significant *J.B.L. 256 in promptly resolving the issue in at least two other similar cases. First,
counsel to the claimant/respondents (on appeal) in Alliance Bank JSC on the second day of the
hearing of the matter (before the Court of Appeal) in the light of the decision of the Court of Appeal’s
decision in VTB abandoned the contractual route to establishing exclusive English jurisdiction
(through the piercing of the corporate veil) against the sixth to eighth defendants/appellants.27
Secondly, when the issue which came before the Court of Appeal in VTB simultaneously came before
Teare J. in Antonio Gramsci Shipping Corp v Lembergs,28 Teare J., recognising that this was a vexed
issue, awaited the Court of Appeal’s decision in VTB. Teare J. as a matter of judicial precedent was
bound to follow the Court of Appeal’s decision in VTB.29
The claimants dissatisfied with the Court of Appeal’s decision in VTB appealed to the UK Supreme
Court. The UK Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeal’s decision. The UK Supreme Court was
called upon to pronounce on whether the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil did exist. Although the
UK Supreme Court refrained from making a pronouncement on whether the doctrine of piercing the
corporate veil did exist,30 it held that, assuming the doctrine did exist, English law did not recognise it
as making a party who is not privy to a contract to become bound by it as a consequence of the
operation of the doctrine, and there was no principled justification to expand the law.31 Fortunately,
another UK Supreme Court very recently considered the operation of the doctrine of piercing the
corporate veil. The majority32 reached some consensus33 that the doctrine did exist and was to be
used in necessary and limited circumstances where no other remedy was available to the victim that
alleges the corporate structure has been abused through some impropriety by some person "under an
existing legal obligation or liability or subject to an existing legal restriction …".34 The decision
confirmed *J.B.L. 257 the UK Supreme Court’s decision in VTB that the doctrine of piercing the
corporate veil cannot be used to get around the doctrine of privity of contract in order to bind a party
to a jurisdiction agreement under art.23 of Brussels I because it is not an abuse of the corporate
structure to rely on the doctrine of privity of contract to avoid the controller being held liable for the
acts of the company.35
Thus, when the issue came recently before the Court of Appeal in Lembergs,36 the claimants
abandoned the contractual route to establishing jurisdiction under art.23 of Brussels I. The claimants
advanced the view that under EU law the court could pierce the corporate veil to find a party who
controls a company and abuses its corporate structure as deemed to have consented to the
jurisdiction agreement under art.23 despite his not being a party to the agreement as a matter of
national law. The Court of Appeal dismissed the case of the claimants as being unknown to EU law,
as could be deciphered from the Court of Justice of European Union (CJEU) cases that required real
consent that is clearly and precisely demonstrated to establish jurisdiction under art.23.37 It further
ruled that the only cases where third parties have been held bound by jurisdiction agreements as
could be deciphered from the CJEU authorities was in cases of transfer of all rights and obligations
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under the contract to the third party.38 This was not the position in this case.
Analysing the approach of the English judges on the issue
There was a consensus among English judges that English law governs the identity of parties to the
jurisdiction agreement, while art.23 of Brussels I governs the issue of consent.39 There are, however,
two other sub-issues which require further consideration. The first sub-issue is the use of the analogy
of the relationship between agent and principal (or undisclosed principal) as a basis for advancing the
view that the court can pierce the corporate veil to hold a party who is not privy to a contract as bound
by the contract and jurisdiction agreement contained therein. The second sub-issue considers the
possibility that the corporate veil can be pierced to establish jurisdiction against the controller on the
basis that the controller was deemed to have consented to the agreement.
The first sub-issue is important because it (the analogy) provided foundation for the view that the
corporate veil could be pierced to get around the doctrine of privity of contract in establishing
exclusive jurisdiction. This analogy was inspired by the decision of Cooke J. in Standard Steamship
Owners P & I Association v GIE Vision Bail,40 where he held that "if the agent specifically agrees a
jurisdiction *J.B.L. 258 clause, and it is within his actual or ostensible authority to do so, that ought to
bind the principal. The agent stands in the shoes of the principal".41 The decision of Cooke J. in
Standard Steamship probably influenced Beatson J. in Stepanovs at the ex parte stage to express the
view that:
"Where there is a good arguable case that the requirements for piercing the corporate veil have been
satisfied and the Defendant is the alter ego, or one of the alter egos of the Corporate Defendants,
there is also a good arguable case that he should be regarded as stepping into their shoes so that the
acts of the Corporate Defendants are seen as his acts … to be seen as agreeing to the jurisdiction of
the court by reason of the jurisdiction agreement … in a manner which satisfies the requirement of
Article 23." 42
The same judgment of Cooke J. certainly influenced Burton J. to express the view that there is "no
good reason of principle or jurisprudence why the victim cannot enforce the agreement against the
puppet company and the puppet who, all the time, was pulling the strings".43 In Alliance Bank JSC,44
he reaffirmed his view that:
"The question of whether the veil should be pierced in such a situation, so as to decide whether the
puppeteers are parties to the contract, is to be resolved, just as would be issues of agency,
undisclosed or otherwise …." 45
The Court of Appeal and UK Supreme Court in VTB explained why this analogy was misplaced. First,
the law relating to undisclosed principals and agents was recognised as anomalous because it runs
counter to the fundamental principles of privity of contract.46 Thus, the doctrine of piercing the
corporate veil had to be considered independently except if it would be unjust and unprincipled not to
extend the anomaly.47 Secondly, while English law recognised the identity of the principal as a party
to the jurisdiction agreement entered into by the agent because the agent was authorised to do so by
the principal (or undisclosed principal), the same relationship could not be attributed to relationship
between the controller of the company and the company.48
The second sub-issue is important because the doctrine of abuse of rights (which is similar to the
doctrine of piercing the corporate veil) is recognised in other *J.B.L. 259 Member States that operate
the civil law system.49 If some English judges at the lower court decided or expressed the view that
the corporate veil could be pierced in order to get around the doctrine of privity of contract and
provide requisite consent for establishing jurisdiction under art.23, there is a reasonable chance that if
this issue comes before other Member State countries, they may be attracted to the view that the
doctrine of abuse of rights can be used as a basis of getting around the principle of privity of contract
and provide requisite consent for establishing exclusive jurisdiction.
The author is of the view that assuming civil law countries are attracted to the view that the doctrine of
abuse of rights can be used to get around the doctrine of privity of contract to establish the identity of
the parties under art.23, it will be erroneous to regard the third party as having agreed or really
consenting to jurisdiction clearly and precisely as a matter of EU law because the third party did not
intend to be a party to the contract.50 To state it more clearly, assuming the UK Supreme Court had
ruled that English law recognised the use of the doctrine of piercing the veil to get around the doctrine
of privity of contract in order to establish the identity of the parties to the jurisdiction agreement, it
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would be wrong to regard the controller or third party as having consented to the agreement as a
matter of EU law under art.23.51 Therefore, the author respectfully regards the views expressed by
some English judges to the contrary as no longer representing good law.52 Furthermore, the author
also agrees with the Court of Appeal (per Beatson L.J.) in the Lemberg that the only recognised case
at the moment in which a third party who is originally not privy to a contract can become privy to a
legal relationship in a jurisdiction agreement and regarded as having consented to it is in cases of
transfer of all rights and obligations under the contract to the third party. *J.B.L. 260 53
Implications and policy considerations
The implication of the decisions of the English courts on this issue means that where a controller sets
up a company for the very fraudulent purpose of inducing a party to enter into a transaction to which
the controller is not privy, the victim cannot rely upon the jurisdiction of the English courts to pierce
the corporate veil to hold the controller as a party to the contract, and also use it as a basis to
establish jurisdiction under art.23. On the face of it, it may be said the English approach has at least
two troubling consequences for an international trader. First, the English approach lends weight to
commercial fraud. Secondly, it also leads to a multiplicity of judicial proceedings and an increase in
litigation costs if the victim cannot claim benefit of the exclusive jurisdiction clause that he is ordinarily
not privy to through the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil.54
Fortunately, the English courts were alive to these policy considerations and provided some
response. On the first policy consideration, the approach taken by the English courts can be justified
as preserving the traditional doctrines of corporate legal personality and privity of contract. These
legal doctrines as stated above form a core aspect of the commercial life of the business world. At
least three observations can be deduced as to why English courts adopted its approach on the first
policy consideration. First, disregarding the corporate legal personality rule in order to get a controller
who is not a party to a contract to become bound by it had never been known to English law or
invoked until the decision in the Stepanovs case. Arnold J., with whom the Court of Appeal and UK
Supreme Court agreed, regarded the approach in the Stepanovs case as another way of avoiding the
doctrine of privity of contract.55 The Court of Appeal Justices and UK Supreme Court Justices who
agreed with Arnold J. found no principled justification for extending the law to permit piercing the
corporate veil in order to get around the doctrine of privity of contract.56 The use of the doctrine of
piercing the corporate veil to get around get around the doctrine of privity of contract as a basis to
found English jurisdiction under art.23 was not good justification.57 Secondly, the view was expressed
that extending the law to recognise the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil as a basis to get around
the doctrine of privity of contract may create legal uncertainty such as where the third party who is
claimed to be liable under the contract seeks to enforce some of its provisions by way of set off or
cross-claim in defence to an action by the victim.58 Thirdly, English law provided adequate remedies
against a person who is not privy to contract in cases of commercial fraud in the tort of deceit or
fraudulent misrepresentation,59 unjust enrichment, principles of equity (such as injunctive remedies
and specific performance), the law of trusts and other statutory remedies. *J.B.L. 261
The answer to the second policy consideration as a matter of EU law can be justified on at least on
two grounds. First, for jurisdiction to be highly predictable it is generally founded on the defendant’s
domicile and it is only to be derogated from in special circumstances such as recognising party
autonomy in jurisdiction agreement.60 Therefore, the use of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil
to bind a stranger to a contract and the jurisdiction clause contained therein does not justify
derogating from establishing jurisdiction at the defendant’s domicile, because the stranger did not
consent or intend to be bound by the contract and the jurisdiction clause contained therein.61
Secondly, it would amount to infringing the right of a defendant (who is not privy to a contract) to have
full access to justice if the court imposes a jurisdiction agreement the defendant never consented to
or intended to be bound by.62
Conclusion
A convergence would have been created between the doctrines of piercing the corporate veil, party
autonomy in jurisdiction agreement and privity of contract if the Court of Appeal and UK Supreme
Court favoured the decision of Burton J. in Stepanovs and Alliance Bank JSC. In other words, it would
have led to the recognition of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil as a device that gets around
the doctrine of privity of contract as a basis for establishing jurisdiction under art.23 of Brussels I.
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The decision(s) to reject that convergence reflects the varied policy choices between extending the
doctrine of piercing the corporate veil to avoid the doctrine of privity of contract in a bid to establish
jurisdiction under art.23, thereby tackling commercial fraud and reducing the problems of multiplicity
of judicial proceedings and associated litigation cost; and on the other hand preserving the traditional
rules of corporate legal personality, privity of contract, and clear and precise consent in jurisdiction
agreements in order to enhance international commercial transactions in the business world, and
ensure that strangers to a contract are not bound by the jurisdiction clauses contained therein.
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